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CASENOTE

Doe v. University of Michigan, District

Court Strikes Down University Policy
Against Racial Harassment on Grounds
of Vagueness and Overbreadth.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In all instances the University authorities should act with
maximum constraint, even in the face of obvious bad taste or
provocation. The belief that some opinion is pernicious, false,

or in any other way detested cannot be grounds for its
suppression.'

Incidents of racial harassment and violence are occurring with

frequency on college and university campuses across the country. 2

Reports indicate racial harassment has increased as much as 400%
since 1985.1 A survey of black seniors graduating from Harvard

College found that nearly 90% had encountered some type of discrim-

ination. 4 A random examination of incidents which occurred in 1990

1. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 868 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(citing a statement on Freedom of Speech and Artistic Expression, adopted by the
University of Michigan Board of Regents in 1977).

2. Carol Innerst, Colleges Torn by Racial Violence,

THE WASHINGTON TIMES,

Oct. 26, 1989, at Al ("As many as one out of five minority students experience
some violence or harassment" during the academic year according to Howard J.
Ehrlich of the National Institute against Prejudice.); see also Chalsa M. Loo & Garry
Rolision, Alienation of Ethnic Minority Students at a Predominantly White University, 57 J. HIGHER EDUC. 58, 72 (1986) (linking alienation and academic deficiency).
3. David A. Shenk, Young Hate, CV the College Magazine, February 1990,
34, 36; see also

HOWARD J.

EHRLICH,

CAMpus

ETHNOVIOLENCE

AND

THE POLICY

13-14 (1990) (A survey of St. Cloud State University minority and international students reported 52% had been verbally harassed and 25% reported physical
attacks.).
4. Anthony Flint, In a Poll, Black Harvard Graduates Cite Bias, Slurs and
Isolation Recounted, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 1, 1990, p.32 (The forms of discrimination ranged from slurs to being stopped by the police for identification while white
students were not. The report also found that 840 of those surveyed encountered
such harassment only infrequently.).
OPTIONS
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and 1991 reflects the persistment of racial problems.' On April 26,
1990, at Smith College in Massachusetts, a black student found a
note under his door which stated, "[a]frican monkey do you want
some bananas? Go back to the [j]ungle." ' 6 At Brown University in
Rhode Island on April 28th, 1990, a note- was found which read,
"[ojnce upon a time Brown was a place where a white man could go
to class without having to look at little black faces . . . except when
he went to take his meals. Things have been going downhill since the
kitchen help moved into the classroom."' On the campus of Arizona
State University four black women were exposed to a flyer which was
labeled, "Simplified form of a job application. Form for Minority
Applicants." ' 8 This form included statements such as "[slources of
income (1) theft, (2) welfare, (3) unemployment." 9 At Georgetown
University, a white student inquired as to whether a minority faculty
member's course evaluation should be written in "black vernacular." 10
In one of the more publicized incidents in 1991, a student at Brown
University stood in a courtyard and in a drunken rage screamed racial
epithets."
In reacting to incidents involving minority students, university
officials are being called upon to respond to the problems of racial
harassment. Many universities and colleges have adopted policies
against racial harassment1 2 in order to alleviate alleged verbal abuse
5. Incidents of this nature have not been limited to 1990 and 1991 alone. See

generally, Chris Lutz, THEY DON'T ALL WEAR SHEETS: A CHRONOLOGY OF RACIST
AND FAR RIGHT VIOLENCE-1980-1986 (1987) (compilation of more than 3,000 inci-

dents of ethno-violence occurring between 1980 and 1986); see also Florestine Purnell,
Racial Incidents "happen all the time, " U.S.A. TODAY, Dec. 4, 1990, at A6 (numerous
examples of racial incidents noted).
6. David Shenk, Young Hate, C.V. THE COLLEGE MAGAZINE 34, 38 (Feb.
1990).
7. Id.
8. Nat Hentoff, The Right Thing At ASU, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 25,
1991 at A19..

9. Id.

10. Saundra Torry, Racial Tension Scars Georgetown, THE WASHINGTON POST,
April 21, 1991, at Al.
11. Jonathen Yardley, At Brown, A Hard Lesson in Free Speech, THE WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 18, 1991 at C2 (This is the first reported case where a student
was later expelled and banished from the campus under the terms of a racial

harassment policy.); see also Student at Brown is Expelled Under a Rule Barring
Hate Speech, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1991, at A17, col. 1.

12. Copies of three universities polices can be found in Jack M. Battaglis,

Regulation of Hate Speech by EducationalInstitutions.-A Proposal, 31 SANTA CLARA

L.

REV.

345 (1991) (Appendix B University of California; Appendix C Stanford
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of minority students. Presumably, sanctioning students for the use of
certain types of speech and conduct will diminish the number of

reported incidents of harassment. 3 These policies have the effect of
sanctioning speech which may be prohibited by the constitution, but

also speech which may Iot be constitutionally restricted as well.
Because these policies appear to sanction constitutionally pro-

tected speech, they have generated controversy. 14 Controversy over

University Policy; Appendix D University of Michigan); e.g., Robin M. Hulshizer,
Note, Securing Freedom from Harassment Without Reducing Freedom of Speech:
Doe v. University of Michigan, 76 IOWA L. REV. 384, 394 nn.79-80 (1991) (Schools
which have such policies include Purdue University and Stanford University. Those
which have proposed adoption of such codes of conduct include University of Iowa
and University of Texas.); accord, William Grady, Colleges Should Fight Race Bias
Before It Happens, Cm. TRIB., May 16, 1991, at C4 (It is reported that an estimated
100-200 of the nations colleges and universities have adopted disciplinary codes.);
Colleges'Anti-HarassmentPolicies Bring Controversy Over Free-Speech Issues, THE
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 4, 1989, at A38 [hereinafter "Anti-Harassment"]
(Institutions taking action include: Emory, Brown, Pennsylvania State, Tufts, Trinity
College, California, Connecticut, Michigan, North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Arizona State, Eastern Michigan, The University of Texas at
Austin, and Stanford.).
13. A similar attempt at a solution to ethnoviolence is evident in state statutes.
At least 19 states have adopted laws which impose heightened penalties for people
convicted of committing certain crimes motivated by prejudice. See e.g., ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-7.1 (1990) ("A person commits a hate crime when by reason
of the race, color ... of another individual ... he commits [certain listed offenses]."); see also HOGAN & HARTSON, STRIKING BACK AT BIGOTRY: REMEDIES UNDER

FEDERAL AND STATE LAW FOR VIOLENCE MOTIVATED BY RACIAL, RELIGION AND ETHNIC

(1986 & Supp. 1988). But see Ken Hoover, Bill Banning Speech Codes
Passes Senate, U.P.I., June 4, 1991 (LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Omni File) (Indicating
that the California State Senate had passed legislation prohibiting high schools and
colleges, both private and public, from imposing speech codes on students.).
PREJUDICE

14. See generally, Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989); Charles R. Lawrence III, If

He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431
(1990) (hate speech equivalent to fighting words); Richard Delgado, Words that
Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name-Calling, 17 HAv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Jack M. Battaglis, Regulation of Hate Speech by
EducationalInstitutions: A Proposal, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 345 (1991) (author
proposes constitutionally acceptable model code); Note, The Call for Campus Conduct Policies: Censorship or Constitutionally Permissible Limitations on Speech, 75
MINN. L. REV. 201 (1990) (proposing that workplace hostile environment analysis be
adopted in the university setting to restrict harassing speech); Laura C. Goodman,
Note, Shacking Up with the First Amendment: Symbolic Expression and the Public
University, 64 IND. L. REV. 711 (1991) (Author argues that the mission of a university
is education; contrary uses of a campus which compete with this mission may be
prohibited.). But see Jens B. Keopke, The University of California Hate Speech
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racial conduct policies reached the judicial system for the first time

in Doe v. University of Michigan.'5 An examination of the University
of Michigan policy by the court proved fatal: the district court held
the policy to be unconstitutional on grounds of overbreadth and
vagueness, and struck it down as a violation of the First Amendment.
This note will explore the court's decision in Doe and will examine

the underlying university policy. First, this note provides a background
section that furnishes an understanding of the framework in which
First Amendment decisions are made. Second, this note sets out the
facts in Doe and examines the decision and rationale of the court.
Last, this note analyzes the court's decision and ultimately concludes
that the court's decision was proper.
A. BACKGROUND

The First Amendment clearly states that, "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.' ' 6 While on its face the
language appears to render an absolute right of free speech, the Court
has never held that to be the case. 7 Rather, the Court has adopted
Policy: A Good Heart in Ill-Fitting Garb, 12 CoM/ENT JNL. 599 (1990); DINESH
D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS (1991)
(Author argues against imposition of racially motivated classifications and adoption
of university speech codes.).
15. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (Since this case has been decided, two
other case involving university racial conduct policies have been docketed. The first
was Wu v. University of Conn., No. H89-649 (D.Conn. Jan. 25, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed Library, Dist. File) (Case ended in a consent decree which amended the
adopted rule to prohibit only narrowly defined "fighting words."); In the second
case, the district court in Wisconsin granted summary judgment to University of
Wisconsin-Madison Post and struck down the University of Wisconsin speech code
policy as unconstitutional. See The UWM Post, Inc., et. al. v. Board of Regents of
the Univ. of Wis. System No. 90-C-328 (E.D. Wis., Oct. 11, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed
Library, Dist. File).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I. But cf. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibition against
unreasonablesearches and seizures) [emphasis added].
17. E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961), reh'g
denied, 368 U.S. 869 ("We reject the view that freedoms of speech and association
...are absolutes."). Contra, Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 61-63 (Black, J., dissenting)
"I do not subscribe to that doctrine for I believe that the First Amendments
unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgment of the rights of
free speech ....
[T]he very object of adopting the First Amendment...
was to put the freedoms protected there completely out of the area of any
congressional control . . . I fear that the creation of tests by which speech
is left unprotected under certain circumstances is a standing invitation to
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certain methods by which a determination can be made as to whether
particular speech is protected or open for restriction.
One of the first tests developed to justify abridging freedom of
speech was the clear and present danger test advanced by Justices
Holmes and Brandeis."8 In Schenk v. United States, 19 the Court upheld
the defendant's conviction for causing, and attempting to cause,
insubordination in the armed forces and obstruction of the draft. 20 In
doing so, the Court permitted Congress to prohibit strong vocal
opposition to the draft that was coupled with imminent danger of
violence. This prohibition was allowed by the Court as a restraint on
freedom of expression. As Justice Holmes stated, "[t]he question in
every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and
are of a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." '2' The test examines the circumstances surrounding the defendant's conduct and asks whether an imminent and real danger exists
that harmful results will occur.
As the Court entered the 1950's, a revision of the clear and
present danger test took place. In Dennis v. United States,2 2 the Court
adopted Judge Learned Hand's characterization of the test. In doing
so, the Dennis Court held the test to be, "[in each case courts must
ask whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger."123 The formula adopted by the Court was a balancing test
abridge it . ..
Id. at 61-63. See generally Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment
"Absolutes, A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549 (1962); Harry Kalven Jr.,

Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L.

REV.

428 (1967); accord Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961
SuP. CT. REV. 245 (1961).
18. See Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United States
250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see generally Ragan, Justice Oliver

Wendall Holmes Jr., Zacharah Chafee Jr., and the Clear and Present Danger Test

for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58 J. AM. HIST. 24 (1971).
19. 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (Holmes., J.).
20. Schenk, 249 U.S. at 49.
21. Schenk, 249 U.S. at 52.
22. 341 U.S. 494 (1951), reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 936 (1958).
23. Dennis at 510 (citing United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2nd Cir.

1950)); see generally Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First
Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159 (1982);
Frank R. Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Schenk to
Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 41 (1969); Robert Mollan, Smith Act
Prosecutions: The Effect of the Dennis and Yates decisions, 26 U. PrrT. L. REV. 705
(1965).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol, 12

weighing the seriousness of the danger against the individual's competing interest in free speech. This formulation departed from the
original test in that neither side of the clear and present danger test
appeared to be given presumptive weight.
During the 1960's, the Court continued to refine the clear and
present danger test.14 The Court's reformulation of the test was most
clearly explained in Brandenburg v. Ohio as the state may not "forbid
or prosecute advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing" such result.2
As modified by the Court's decision in Brandenburg, the test now
focuses on the inciting language of the actor and whether it is likely
26
to produce a clear and present danger.
In interpreting the definition of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has applied other tests to determine whether or not a
certain type of speech is protected. One of the other tests developed
by the Court to justify abridging the absolute language of the First
Amendment is "fighting words." 2 7 The fighting words test was first
developed in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.21 Chaplinsky had been
convicted of using, in a public place, words likely to cause a breach
of the peace. In upholding the conviction, the Court held that such
utterances were without communicative value and likely to provoke
the average person to retaliate, thereby causing a breach of the peace. 29

24. This reformulation is most evident in three particular cases. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (reversed conviction of a Klu Klux
Klan leader for the violation of Ohio's criminal syndicism statute); Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam) (Reversed conviction of the defendant for
violating a statute prohibiting individuals from "willfully" and "knowingly" threatening the life of the President); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (members of the
Georgia legislature challenged the right of a duly elected state
representative to be seated).
25. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
26. See generally Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern
First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 75455 (1975); Halis A. Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in
the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970); Staughton Lind, Comment,
Brandenburgv. Ohio: A Speech Test for All Seasons, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 151 (1975).
27. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942) (defining
fighting words as "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace"); see generally Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words
as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531 (1980).
28. 315 U.S. 568 (1942); see generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA, ET. AL., TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, §§ 20.37-20.40 (1986) [heri-

nafter Treatise].
29. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574. In Chaplinsky, a New Hampshire statute had
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The test developed by the Court was whether a person of ordinary
intelligence would understand the words as likely to cause a person
to react and fight.30 If words are likely to incite a person of common
intelligence to retaliate, then such speech can be regulated.
Though subsequent decisions by the Court have questioned the
validity of the fighting words doctrine,3" it appears to have retained
some validity. While courts have failed to use the test to uphold a
statute or conviction that restricts speech, they have explicitly mentioned the continued validity of the "fighting words" test.12 In fact,
the Court in Cohen v. California33 seemed willing to scrutinize the
34
results of the conduct even though they overturned the conviction.
Cohen, and other cases suggest that while the "fighting words"
doctrine is still accepted, it is applied in a more restrictive manner.
In situations where legislatures have adopted statutes which are
justified by "clear and present danger," "fighting words," or some
been enacted which banned face to face words likely to cause a breach of the peace.
Chaplinsky's conviction was based on an encounter with a city marshall whom he
described while being arrested as a "God-dammed Racketeer and a dammed fascist."
Justice Murphy stated that fighting words are not constitutionally protected because
their "slight social value as a step to truth .

.

. is clearly outweighed by the social

interest in order and morality." Id. at 572.
30. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
31. In fact at least one Supreme Court Justice, Justice Blackmun, has expressed
that the Court is paying homage to an already overruled rule of law. See Gooding
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 537 (1972) (Blackmun J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court, despite
it's protestations to the contrary, is merely paying lip service to Chaplinsky.").
32. See Gooding, 405 U.S. at 520 n.1 (Defendant addressed a policeman in the
following manner, "you son of a bitch I'll choke you to death," and was convicted
of two counts of using opprobious words and abusive language in violation of the
statute. The Court overturned the statute on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.);
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (In violation of a Louisiania
statute which prohibited swearing at a police officer the defendant had stated, "you
goddamm motherfucking police." The Court overturned the statute on grounds of
overbreadth and vagueness, holding, "words conveying or intending to convey
disgrace are not fighting words."); Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14 (1973)
(The Court overturned defendant's conviction on the basis that no fighting words
exist when defendant verbally and negatively protested his arrest.); see generally John
E. NOWAK, ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 946-47 (3d Ed. 1986) [herinafter Constitutional Law] (present status of the "fighting words" and "hostile audience"
doctrines).
33. 403 U.S. 15, 22-26 (1971).
34. The Cohen court viewed the government's ability to cut off discourse for
the protection of the public dependant upon "a showing that substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner." Cohen, 403 U.S. at
21. In order to make a determination of this nature, the Court found it necessary to
examine Cohen's behavior. Id. at 22.
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other rationale, such as obscenity, time, place and manner restrictions,
courts utilize certain tools of construction to determine the validity
of the statute. If a statute is adopted which seems to prohibit speech
on the basis of "fighting words" but would include speech that does
not rise to the level of "fighting words," then the court is likely to
strike down the law on the basis of overbreadth. A similar statute
that fails to make clear which "fighting words" are to be prohibited
would be struck down on grounds of vagueness. Both statutes would
be deemed unconstitutional, however, upon failure to utilize the least
restrictive means available in seeking the desired result. 5
An overbroad statute attempts to sanction speech or activity
which is not protected by the Constitution while including within its
scope speech or conduct protected by the Constitution. 6 The doctrine
of overbreadth has been held to be "strong medicine" and has been
limited to cases where conduct in addition to speech is involved and
to situations where the overbreadth is substantial.37 Overbroad statutes
typically fall into one of three categories: (1) censorial laws; (2)
inhibitory laws; and (3) remedial laws.38 A doctrine often discussed
simultaneously with overbreadth is the doctrine of void-for-vagueness.3 9 A statute which is considered void-for-vagueness fails to pro35. This is in accordance with the view that even legitimate government interests
may not be pursued by means that "[b]roidly stifle fundamental personal liberties."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 348.
36. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 1
(1981); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844
(1970); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1022 (2nd ed. 1988).
37. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) ("[T]o put the matter
another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe
that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well,
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.").

38. Laws which are censorial in nature would seek to burden those who advocate
matters of public concern. An inhibitory law would be neutral as to the viewpoint
advocated, but would affect expressive and associative conduct. Remedial laws seek
to correct historically suppressed values. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 315 (West Supp.
1991) (Fairness Doctrine for Broadcast Media), Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969) (laws that are remedial in nature seek to promote values which
the First Amendment encompasses that have been suppressed); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1937) (Inhibitory laws impinge on expressive and associational conduct
but impact tends to be neutral as to viewpoints sought to be advocated.); Note, The
FirstAmendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 918 (1970) (Remedial
laws hamper First Amendment activities for the purpose of promoting values which
are within the concern of the amendment.).
39. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); N.A.A.C.P.
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). At least one article has suggested the two tests are
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vide any indication as to whether constitutionally protected conduct
or speech falls within the statute's prohibition. 4° If a court must err
when deciding whether to uphold a particular statute, it is better to
err on the side that protects speech, rather than the side that restricts
it. One author has characterized void-for-vagueness as it is "better to
be safe than sorry." ' 4' Such a viewpoint is a recognition that when
dealing with fundamental rights such as free speech, it is better to
disallow restrictions than take a chance of inhibiting individual rights.
Several reasons are advanced for implementing the vagueness
doctrine. First, the lack of notice might hinder the exercise of a
fundamental right, such as free speech. 42 An individual seeking to
engage in what is constitutionally permitted speech, but who is
unaware of where the demarcation between protected and unprotected
speech is located, may not engage in any speech. Such individuals
may do so out of the fear that sanctions would be brought against
them 4 This phenomena is known as the "chilling effect." Second,
without clear guidance, those who enforce the law may be prone to
abuse their discretion by selective enforcement. 44 Third, only narrow,
clear statutes will evidence a sincere judgment of the legislature that
certain speech needs to be regulated. 45 If, in the legislature's judgment,
indistinguishable. See generally Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1967). See Laurence H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 12-31 (2nd ed. 1988).

40. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972). Elements of

the Vagueness Doctrine have been brought forth in a large number of Supreme Court
cases. These have been categorized in Grayned. Id.

41. DAVID

BOGEN, BULWARK OF LIBERTY

164 (1984).

42. E.g., Cohaulti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979) ("[I]t is settled that,

as a matter of due process, a . . . statute which fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence notice that his conduct is forbidden ... is void for vagueness. This
appears to be especially true where the ... the statute threatens . . the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights."); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 (1973) ("The
settled principles of the [vagueness doctrine] incorporate notions of fair notice or
warning.").
43. For a discussion of the "chilling effect," see Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk
and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect, 58 B. U. L. REV. 685
(1978).
44. E.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). The most important
aspect of the vagueness doctrine "[is] the imposition of guidelines which prohibite[]
arbitrary, selective enforcement on a constitutionally suspect basis by police officers."
According to the court this was of special concern "because of the potential for
arbitrary suppression of First Amendment liberties and restrictions on the freedom
of movement." Id. at 358.
45. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 35.
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a certain type of conduct or speech is deemed to be threatening the
welfare of the state's citizens, then that specific conduct should be
prohibited. Otherwise, the legislature may only be reacting to public
opinion rather than sincere need. The doctrine invalidates statutes
which restrict speech in terms that are so vague that an individual is
left without clear guidance as to the nature of the prohibited speech.'
Finally, even if the governmental concern at stake is one of
compelling interest, "that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved. ' 47 This limitation requires legislatures adopting statutes to choose language which provides the least restriction
possible on free speech. The scope of the legislative abridgment of
free speech "must be viewed in the light of [the least] drastic means
'4
for achieving the same basic purpose."
B. FACTS

In the three years prior to the adoption of the University of
Michigan racial harassment policy, incidents of racism and racial
harassment had become increasingly frequent on the Ann Arbor
campus. 49 On January 27, 1987, a flier was distributed by unknown
individuals which declared "open" season on blacks and referred to
them as "saucer lips." 50 During a listener call-in opportunity on
February 4, 1987, a campus radio station allowed racist jokes to be
broadcast on the air." In response to the broadcast incident, a antiracist demonstration was held on the Michigan campus. During this
demonstration, a Klu Klux Klan uniform was displayed in a dormitory
window.12

46. See Levine v. United States Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 764 F.2d 590,
599 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986) ("A restraining order is
unconstitutionally vague if it fails to give clear guidance regarding the types of speech
for which an individual may be punished."); State v. Princess Cinema of Milwaukee,
292 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Wisc. 1980) (A vague statute is one which " . . . leave[s] the

individual with no clear guidance as to the nature of the acts which are subject to
punishment.").
47. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See generally TREATISE, supra
note 28, at 37-8 (discussing the least restrictive means test).
48. Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488.
49. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 854 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
50. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 854.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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Responding to these and other incidents,

3

the president of the

university issued a statement on February 19, 1987, reaffirming the

University's commitment to the maintenance and creation of a ra-

cially, ethnically, and culturally diverse campus.5 4 As a result of the
incidents which were occurring on the Michigan campus, the chairperson of the State House of Representatives Appropriations Subcommittee on Higher Education held a public hearing at the University

on March 5, 1987." 5 At the close of the hearing, the chairperson

appeared to condition appropriations to the University on the ade56
quacy of the University's response to the racial incidents. Addition-

ally, a class action civil rights suit was threatened against the University
for its purported failure to create or maintain a non-racist educational

environment.57
On December 14, 1987, the president of the university circulated
an internal memorandum detailing a proposed anti-discriminatory
policy.5 This policy was to be enacted pursuant to the powers
delegated to the president by the Michigan Board of

Regents' 9[hereinafter MBOR]. At a January 15, 1988, meeting of the
MBOR, the acting president informed the MBOR of an intent to
adopt the policy, and conceded that civil liberties would be jeopardized
by the policy. 60 Apparently, the acting president' realized the impact

53. What these other incidents may have been were not described by either the
court in its opinion or by the University President.
54. Id.
55. Id. (Forty-eight speakers addressed the subcommittee and an audience of
about six hundred.).
56. Id. The Chairperson stated, "Michigan legislators will not tolerate racism

on the campus of a state institution .... [The Subcommittee] will make our decision
[on appropriations] during the next few weeks .. . . Some things have to change
Holding up funds ... may be part of our response, but that will predicate on
....

how the university responds." Id.
57. Id. According to the court, the United Coalition Against Racism, a campus
anti-discrimination group, was the force behind this litigation threat. Id.
58. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 855.
59. Doe at 855 (Regents By-Law 2.01 provides that "in addition to other duties,
the President of the university shall exercise such general powers as to ...

maintain

the health, diligence, and order among the students.").
60. Id. at 855. The Acting President recognized that the proposed policy would
engender serious First Amendment problems but reasoned,
Just as an individual cannot shout fire in a crowded theater and then claim
immunity from prosecution for causing a riot on the basis of exercising his
rights of free speech, so a great many American Universities have taken the
position that students at a University cannot by speaking or writing discriminatory remarks which seriously offend many individuals beyond the im-
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the proposed policy would have on individual's First Amendment
rights.
It is apparent, however, that the acting president felt the policy
was justified under a clear and present danger test. 6' It appears that
the acting president felt that Holmes' classic, "shouting fire in a
crowded theater," was analogous to racial harassment. 62 According
to the president, an individual may not seriously offend others in the
University community when exercising free speech rights which detract
from the educational climate, any more than one has the right to
cause panic in a crowded theater.
Subsequent to this board meeting, the Director of the Office of
Affirmative Action was instructed to draft a policy on racial harassment. 63 On February 29, 1988, a tentative copy of the proposed policy
was published in the University Record6 and comments were invited
from faculty, staff, and students. 65 Numerous speakers commented
on the proposed policy at a public hearing held on March 16, 1988,
with various changes being suggested." The following day, the same
draft of the policy was introduced for discussion at the monthly Board
of Regents meeting.67 In spite of concerns relating to undue restriction
of students' free speech rights, the policy was approved and became
effective on May 31, 1988.68 University officials promised that an
interpretive guide to accompany the policy would be provided to give
69
examples of sanctionable conduct.
Under the terms of the University Policy, the degree of regulation
was dependent upon the location of the conduct being investigated. 70
mediate victim, and which, therefore detract from the necessary educational
climate of a campus, claim immunity from a campus disciplinary proceeding.
Doe at 855. (According to the court the other "American Universities" to which the

President referred to were not identified.).

61. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
62. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 855.

63. Id.

64. The University Record is a newsletter published for faculty and staff that

informs of events on the campus.
65. Doe, 721 F, Supp. at 855.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 856.
69. Id.
70. Students were subject to discipline for:
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an
individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation,
creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-
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In public parts of campus, the widest range of speech was to be
tolerated. Locations where speech was explictly limited included classroom buildings, libraries, research laboratories, recreation facilities,

and study centers. 7 Publications sponsored by the University, such as

the Michigan Daily and the Michigan Review,72 were not subject to
regulation." Possible sanctions ranged from a formal reprimand to
suspension or expulsion.7 4 Any member of the university community

could have initiated the process leading towards sanction by filing a
formal complaint or by seeking informal counseling."

As the MBOR was informed at the time of the adoption of the
University policy against racial harassment, the University Office of
Affirmative Action issued an interpretive guide purporting to be an

era veteran status, and that
(a) Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's academic
efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored extracurricular activities or personal safety; or
(b) Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with
an individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal safety; or
(c) Creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for educational pursuits, employment or participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities.
2. Sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and verbal or physical
conduct that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of sex
or sexual orientation where such behavior:
(a) Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's academic
efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored extracurricular activities or personal safety; or
(b) Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with
an individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or personal safety; or
(c) Creates an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for educational pursuits, employment or participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities.
Id. at 856. (Section l(c) was withdrawn on August 22, 1989, without notice to the
court or to Doe).
71. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 857.
72. The Michigan Daily is the student newspaper which is distributed daily to
the college population. The Michigan Review is an alternative student paper.
73. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 857.
74. Id. Under the policy, the following sanctions may be imposed: (1) formal
reprimand; (2) community service; (3) class attendance; (4) restitution; (5) removal
from University Housing; (6) suspension from specific courses and activities; (7)
suspension; and (8) expulsion. Id.
75. Id.
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"authoritative interpretation" of the policy.16 This guide provided an
extensive list of sanctionable conduct as well as a section entitled,
"[y]ou are a harasser when . . . ."I Examples in the guide included:
"[A] flyer containing racist threats distributed in a residence hall;"
[a] male student making remarks in class like, "Women aren't as
good in this field as men;" students in a residence hall having a floor
party and "inviting everyone on their floor except one person because
they think she might be a lesbian.""
Doe, a graduate student in the field of biopsychology, perceived
a threat of sanction under the terms of the policy.7 9 Proceeding under
a pseudonym, he brought suit against the University of Michigan
challenging the constitutionality of the policy on grounds of overbreadth and vagueness.80
C.

DECISION AND RATIONALE

The District Court, prior to addressing the substantive issues
presented in Doe, first discussed the issue of standing. In order to
76. Id. at 857-58 (The full title of this guide was "WHAT STUDENTS SHOULD
KNOW ABOUT DISCRIMINATION AND DISCRIMINATING HARASSMENT BY STUDENTS IN THE

")[emphasis added].
77. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 858.
78. Id. Other examples include: "[m]ale students leave pornographic pictures
and jokes on the desk of a female graduate student . . .[t]wo men demand that their
roommate in the residence hall move-out and be tested for AIDS . . . [r]acist graffiti
[is] written on the door of an Asian student's study carrel." The Guide also contained
a separate section entitled, "[ylou are a harasser when.
which contained examples
of discriminatory conduct such as:
You tell 'jokes about gay men and lesbians . . . [y~our student organization
sponsors entertainment that includes a comedian who slurs Hispanics ...
[y]ou make obscene telephone calls or send racist notes or computer messages
.. .[y]ou exclude someone from a study group because that person is of a
different race, sex, or ethnic origin than you are ... [y]ou display a
confederate flag on the door of your room in the residence hall.
Id.
79. Id. Biopsychology is the study of the biological bases of individual differences in personality traits and mental abilities. "[A]n area of study at the interface
of psychology, biology, physiology, biochemistry, the neural excess, and related
areas." Stedmans Medical Dictionary (4th ed. 1976).
80. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 861. Doe initially moved for a preliminary injunction.
At a hearing on August 25, 1989 regarding Doe's motion, the court consolidated the
motion with the trial on the merits. This consolidation was pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 65(a)(2). This rule provides in part: "Before or after the commencement of the
hearing of an application for a preliminary injunction, the court may order the trial
of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the
application." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2) (1989).
UNIVERSITY ENVIRONMENT.
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satisfy the requirements for standing, Doe had to demonstrate a
realistic and credible threat of the policy being enforced against him. s'
According to the findings of the district court, University Officials
had used the policy to sanction classroom discussion. Thus, Doe's
theories regarding the biological differences between men and women
stood a reasonable chance of being sanctioned. 2
The court then proceeded to set forth an overview of which
verbal acts are generally protected by the First Amendment and which
are not. 8 According to the Doe court, it can safely be stated that
84
most extreme forms of discriminatory conduct are not protected.
81. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 858; accord, United Pres. Church v. Reagan, 738
F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459 n.7 (1987),
cert denied, 483 U.S. 1001 (1987) (The mere possibility of being subject to sanction
is insufficient to state a cause of action.); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974);
(realistic and credible threat needed and the threat must be specific and direct.).
In asserting his right to bring this suit, Doe stated.that "his right to freely and
openly discuss theories relating to his work in the field of Biopsychology, some of
which might be considered sexist or racist, was impermissibly chilled by the adoption
and application of the Policy." Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 860. The University responded
by stating that the policy had never been applied to sanction classroom discussion of
legitimate ideas and that Doe did not demonstrate a credible threat of enforcement.
According to the court, had only the plain language of the Policy been before
the court, it might "have to agree with the University that Doe did not have a
genuine and credible belief that the Policy would be used to sanction his conduct."
Doe at 859. The "slate, [however], was not so clean." In addition to the plain terms
of the Policy, the district court had before it the legislative history, the interpretive
guide, and the experience gleaned from a year of enforcement. Judge Cohn determined
that the legislative history as seen in a memo from the University's Acting President
reflected the university's intent to sanction all comments deemed seriously offensive
to individuals beyond the immediate victim. Doe, at 860.
Furthermore the Interpretive Guide issued by the University, while withdrawn at
the "I th" hour, stated an example applicable to Doe. One example of sanctionable
conduct provided, "A male student makes remarks in class like 'women just aren't
as good in this field as men' thereby creating a hostile learning atmosphere for female
classmates." Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 861. According to Doe's affidavit, theories
regarding sex differences in mental abilities between men and women hypothesize
that men as a group do better than women in some spatially related mental tasks
partly because of a biological difference. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 860. Fears that Doe
could be sanctioned could not be taken lightly. Additionally, the court noted that
the university's enforcement of the Policy since enactment reflects that students
making comments in the classroom had been subject to the terms of the policy. See
infra notes 100, 103 and accompanying text. As such, the Court held that Doe's
fears of prosecution were entirely reasonable and that Doe had standing to challenge
the policy. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 861.
82. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 861.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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These include discrimination in employment, education, government
benefits, and on the basis of race, sex, ethnicity and religion. All of
these methods of discrimination are prohibited by the Constitution
and both federal and state statutes. 8' Michigan law provides criminal
penalties and civil remedies for assault and battery.86 Furthermore,
many forms of sexually abusive and harassing conduct are prohibited
by Michigan statute.87 The district court's acknowledgement of the
availability of statutory remedies tacitly recognized that what the
University was attempting to accomplish was redundant and not the
least restrictive means possible to achieve the intended goal.
The court also recognized that "fighting words" would not be
entitled to First Amendment protection. 8 Additionally, speech which
meets the "clear and present danger" test may be prohibited.8 9
According to the court, examples of speech that might be prohibited
include: certain libel, slander, obscene speech, speech which creates a
hostile or abusive working environment on the basis of race or sex,
and speech which is vulgar and shocking.9 The court noted that
narrowly tailored regulations at the university level which subject

85. Id; see U.S. CONST. amends, V, XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1990) (employment); 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (1990) (education); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1990) (government benefits); MICH. CONST. art. I § 2; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.548(202) (employment);
MICH. CONST. Art. VIII, § 2 (education). See generally BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK,
ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1984); THEODORE

EISENBERO, CIvIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION

(1981);

DERICK

A.

BELL, RACE, RACISM AND

AMERICAN LAW (2d. ed. 1980); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality
Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991).
86. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 862; see also MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.276-28.344(2)
(1990) (physical assault, ethnic intimidation); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.609(1) (1990)
(vandalism and property damage). See supra note 13 for examples of state statute
prohibiting ethnic intimidation.
87. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.201-202 (1990) (abduction); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.788 (1990) (rape and other forms of criminal sexual conduct); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.379 (1990) (dissemination of legally obscene materials).
88. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see also supra
notes 27-33 and accompanying text for discussion of fighting words.
89. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 862 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969)); see also supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text for discussion of clear and
present danger.
90. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 862 (citing Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Bids.,
472 U.S. 749 (1985) (libel and slander)); Bethlehem Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675 (1986) (speech which is vulgar, offensive, and shocking); Meritor Say. Bank
v. Vinsor, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (speech creating hostile or abusive working environment); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (prohibition of materials involving
sexual exploitation of children); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (legally
obscene speech).
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speech and conduct to time, place, and manner restrictions are
appropriate. 91
What the university may not do, according to the District Court,
is establish a speech policy which has the effect of prohibiting speech
simply because those in charge of the university disagree with the
ideas or messages sought to be conveyed by the students. 92 Nor may
a university regulate speech merely because it is offensive to large
numbers of people. 93 In the setting of an institution of higher education, these fundamental principles take on a special role. Within a
university, the free and unrestrained exchange of competing views is
essential to the academic mission. 94 Given this, the court considered
the constitutionality of the University of Michigan policy.
The court's discussion first focused on the doctrine of overbreadth. 95 A fundamental principle of constitutional law is that sta91. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 863. (citing Heffron v. Int. Soc'y. for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
92. Id. (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)) ("If there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable."); e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963)
("For the Constitution protects expression and association without regard to. the
race, creed, or political or religious affiliation of the members of the group which
invokes its shield, or to the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs
which are offered.").
93. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 863; see, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989);
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988) (citing Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)) ("It is firmly settled that . . . public expression of ideas

may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of
the hearers.").
94. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 863 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967)); see, e.g., Northern Illinois University Constitution Article 9 (1987).
Article 9.1 states:
Academic Freedom
Freedom of thought, inquiry, and scholarly expression is
fundamental and essential to the maintenance of the
academic community. In all of its actions the
university shall act to uphold this principle and to
create a scholarly environment totally conducive to the
unfettered exploration of ideas and pursuit of
knowledge.
Id. at Art. 9. 1. But see David S. Tatel, Clear, Narrow Policies on Offensive Speech
May Not Run Afoul of the First Amendment, Chronicle of Higher Education, Feb.

7, 1990 at § 2. (". . . [a] college or university is different from society as a whole its
primary responsibility is to protect the integrity of the academic process. Universities
have a legitimate interest in promoting racial diversity and a responsibility to protect
minority students from racial discrimination.").
95. See Treatise, supra note 28, at 24; supra notes 36-38 and accompanying
text for a discussion of overbreadth.
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tutes which regulate "First Amendment activities must be narrowly
drawn to prohibit only the 'specific evil at hand'."6 A prohibition
on speech or conduct simply because it is offensive will be found
unconstitutionally overbroad. 97 This premise is evident in cases like
Houston v. Hill,98 where the Supreme Court struck down a city
ordinance which had prohibited citizens from criticizing police. Such
conduct was deemed constitutionally protected. More recently, in
Texas v. Johnson," the Supreme Court refused to prohibit restraint
on First Amendment activities simply because the activities were
offensive to large numbers of people.
In determining the constitutionality of the Policy, the University
encouraged the court to look at the manner in which the Policy had
been interpreted and applied. In following the University's request,
the court examined three incidents in which University students had
been charged with violating the Policy. The first case dealt with a
graduate psychology student who had stated in class that homosexuality is a disease, and he intended to develop a counseling program
for turning his gay clients straight.'00 As a result of these comments,
the policy administrator informed the student that there was sufficient
evidence to warrant a hearing on charges of both gender and sexual
orientation harassment.' 0 ' The student was acquitted on charges of
sexual orientation harassment. The University did not hesitate, however, in forcing the student to a hearing on both charges. 02 Furthermore, there was no indication that the University would have interceded
to protect the student's First Amendment rights had the student been
found guilty by the hearing panel.
The second case chosen by the court dealt with a student in a
business entrepreneurship class who had read a "homophobic" limerick ridiculing a well-known athlete for his sexual orientation. 03 This
96. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 864 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,

611 (1973)); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (A law regulating

speech will be deemed overbroad if it sweeps within its ambit a substantial amount
of protected speech along with that it may legitimately regulate.).

97. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (striking down flag burning law
on the basis of overbreadth, even though the court recognized such activity is offensive
to the majority of citizens.).
98. 482 U.S. 451 (1985).
99. 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (overruled by anti flag burning statute which was
subsequently held unconstitutional in United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404
(1990)).
100. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 865 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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was not a spontaneous oratory, but was part of a public speaking
exercise. As a result of this in-class attempt at poetry, the student was
investigated by the policy administrator, persuaded to write a letter
of apology, and required to attend an "educational" gay rap session. 10 4 There was no evidence in the accused student's file or in the
administrator's notes to indicate that the University even considered
whether the speech was protected. 0 5
A second year dental student was the subject of the last case
study considered by the court. During an orientation session and in
an informal discussion group for a preclinical dentistry class, a student
was reported to have said that he had heard that minorities had a
difficult time in the course and were not treated fairly.'0° As a direct
result of this statement, the minority professor of the class filed a
complaint on the grounds that the comment was unfair and damaged
her chances for tenure.' °7 The policy administrator persuaded the
dental student to be counseled and to write a letter of apology for
the comment.' 8 No weight was placed by the University on the fact
that the dental student's comments were based on a statement made
by his minority roommate, a former dental student. Failure to examine
the circumstances behind the statement evidenced the University's
intention to place the sole determining factor of whether the Policy
was violated on the subjective mental state of the "victim."
Through analysis of these incidents, the court determined the
validity of the University regulation. In declaring the policy overbroad,
the court held that, "[tihe innocent intent of the speaker was apparently immaterial . . . the administrator ... failed to consider whether
a comment was protected . . . [and] the administrator . . . attempted
to persuade the ... accused student to accept 'voluntary' sanctions." 9 According to the court, given these examples, the university
could not make a successful argument that the policy was never
interpreted to reach protected conduct .110
As additional support for its decision to strike the University
Policy down, the court applied the vagueness doctrine."' To survive
104. Id.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 866.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 866 n.15. (The court's finding that the University interpreted the

policy to reach constitutionally protected speech made it unnecessary to consider

whether the Policy was susceptible to a saving construction.); see Brocket v. Spokane
Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 493-503 (1985).
111. See generally CONsTrrUTONAL LAW, supra note 32, at § 169.
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scrutiny under this doctrine, a statute must give sufficient notice of
the conduct which is prohibited."1 2 The effect caused by the vague
statute must be both real and substantial." 3 An effect of this requirement is that it only leaves room for narrowly-tailored restrictions of
unprotected speech. Such consideration, according to the court, applies with greater force when the statute seeks to prohibit speech
protected by the Constitution.1' 4 Additionally, while not reached by
the Doe court, the statute must not be capable of a narrower saving
construction which would prevent it from being struck down." 5
The terms of the Policy appeared to offer no limitations on the
scope of its prohibition nor any distinction between what is protected
or unprotected speech."16 Under the Policy, language that would
stigmatize or victimize an individual was to be prohibited. 17 The terms
victimize and stigmatize, according to the court, elude precise definition."' The Policy identified prohibited conduct as that which presents
a threat to an individual's academic efforts. It is not clear, however,
how an individual's academic efforts would be victimized or stigmatized by a potential harasser. A test which utilizes the subjective
mental state of the victim offers endless definitions for victimize and
stigmatize, and fails to provide sufficient guidance for potential
offenders to know whether conduct is sanctionable. This is evident in
other areas of law which do not implicate rights as important as free
speech.
Another vague portion of the Policy which the court examined
was the phrase "interfering with an individual's academic efforts."
According to the court, a threat which encompasses an unspecified
threat of future retaliation would be unprotected."19 However, a threat
to the victim's academic success would probably prove to be protected
speech.'20 Under the plain terms of the policy, no guidance was given
as to the meaning of "interfering with ... academic efforts.' 12'
112. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text for discussion of vagueness.
113. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 866 (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974)).
114. Id. (citing Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976)).
115. Id. at 866-67 (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)).
116. Id. at 867.
117. See supra note 64 for a discussion of the University policy.
118. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 867. To stigmatize is "to describe an identity in
opprobrious terms, terms that bring disgrace or ill fame following conduct considered

grossly wrong or vicious." Victimize is defined as "to make a victim
WEBSmR's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1986).

...

"

119. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 867.
120. Id.
121. Id.at 868. The court points out that the one interpretive guide that the
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Without proper guidance, potential violators would have no notice as
to whether their conduct would be sanctionable, thus making the
Policy vague. 22
Finally, in a statement seen by the court as refreshingly candid,
the attorney for the University made it clear that no specified procedure for distinguishing between protected and unprotected speech
existed. According23 to the attorney, such distinction would be made
"very carefully."
As a result of the findings by the court, the policy
was so vague as to violate the due process clause and was held
unconstitutional, and the University was permanently enjoined from
24
enforcing it.
D.

ANALYSIS

The method by which the University implemented the Policy
appeared to mandate the court's decision to strike the policy down.
A fundamental concept of First Amendment law is that regulations
which are vague in nature will not be upheld.' 25 Individuals must be
given proper notice of when their conduct is prohibited. The remarks
made by University legal counsel at oral argument were a clear
26
indication that even the University believed the Policy was vague.
When an attorney has to be "very careful" in deciding whether
conduct violates the terms of the Policy, the ability of students of
ordinary intelligence to predict whether their behavior is sanctionable
must be severely questioned.
When it adopted the Policy, the University sought to combat any
vagueness by the use of a comprehensive guidebook which described

University provided was withdrawn as inaccurate. According to the court, an implied
admission that even the university itself was unsure of the precise scope and meaning
of the policy. Id. at 867.
122. See supra note 42 for a discussion of lack of notice in vagueness situations.
123. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 867.
124. Id. (citing Cramp v. Board of Public Interest, 368 U.S. 278, 285-88 (1961)).
125. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text; see also Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974) ("When a statutes literal scope, unaided by a narrowing
.. interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the 1st Amendment,
the [vagueness] doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity."); Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ("[Wie insist laws give the person of ordinary

intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited."); Cable Alabama
Corp. v. City of Huntsville Ala., 768 F. Supp. 1484, 1505 (N.D. Ala. 1991)("[Wjhere

a statute implicates First Amendment concerns, it must have clear application in all
circumstances . . ").
126. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 867.

[Vol. 12

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

what conduct would be deemed sanctionable.' 27 This proved disastrous
to the University's contention that the Policy was constitutional. An
example of an individual making remarks about women not being as
good as men in the University guidebook, in addition to the examples
of sanctioned conduct, gave the court the nexus it needed to demonstrate that classroom conduct could be sanctioned.' 21 It is difficult to
see how the University could legitimately argue that Doe's teaching
of the biological differences between men and women, and related
theories, would not be sanctionable when the guidebook provided an
analogous example.
In order to remedy the guidebook's apparently misleading examples, the University sought to withdraw it at the eleventh hour and
encouraged the court to look at how the Policy had been applied. 2 9
This also proved damaging to the University's claim. Attempting to
sanction a graduate psychology student for an in-class statement about
his belief that "homosexuality was a disease" was a grievous error
on the part of the University. Expressing an idea, even though
outdated, goes to the very core of the First Amendment.130 While not
accepted by the majority of practicing psychiatrists, the belief that
homosexuality is a disease is still opined by a number of practicing
psychiatrists. '"' A majority of people do not appear to hold this
opinion. For purposes of the First Amendment, however, public
opinion is irrelevant. 3 2 To restrict legitimate classroom debate over
127. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
university's comprehensive guidebook.
128. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 858.
129. Id. at 856.
130. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text; See also Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) ("We have been particulary vigilant to ensure that
individual expressions of ideas remain free from governmently imposed sanctions.").
The Falwell court noted that, "[a]t the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition
of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions .

. . ."

Falwell,

485 U.S. at 50; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihat the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas,
that the best truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted.").
131.
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(5th ed. 1983). "Traditionally, homosexuality has been considered a psychological
disorder, but several years ago [dating back from 19831 the American Psychiatric
Association rejected the idea that homosexuality is a disease or that homosexuals are
sick. However, a number of psychiatrists continue to argue that homosexuality is
necessarily a symptom of neurosis, immaturity, personality disorders, or faulty
upbringing." Id.
132. E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963) ("[T]he Constitution
protects expression and association without regard . ..to the truth, popularity, or
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an idea, no matter how unpopular or outdated, only evidences the
University's intention to coerce students into advocating only "politically correct" ideas. Such sanction of an in-class statement violates
the guiding principle that protection of the free expression of ideas,
and discussion of them, is the purpose of the First Amendment. The
University, however, as evidenced by the examples chosen by the
court, sought to control the regulation of ideas as well as conduct.
What the University sought to prohibit by adopting the Policy
was a violation of the overbreadth doctrine.' Once again, examples
in the guidebook evidenced an intent to do more than address a
specific evil. The University, by prohibiting the hanging of a confederate flag on a dorm room door and the controlling of whom one
studies with, sought to control the expressions and behavior of the
university students. 3 4 While such expression and behavior may be
repugnant to the majority of society or to the university population,
it must also be abusive and directed at an individual. According to
the court, had the University sought to regulate speech which creates
a hostile or abusive working environment on the basis of race or sex,
the regulation might have been allowed.' 35 When the University sought
to prohibit classroom discussion of even antiquated ideas, however,
it did much more than prohibit an abusive working environment: it
became "big brother" to what expression we are exposed to, and
what ideas we are entitled to express.
There is little doubt that a speech or a statement of one's belief
that women or minorities are inferior to males or whites is the
expression of an offensive idea. Universities which seek to eradicate
such behavior from their campuses are pursuing worthy objectives.
Such ideas, however, should be fought with statements and speeches
of the belief of equality for all and the persuasion of the general
public to recognize that belief. 3 6 When a person takes an offensive

social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered."); accord Meyer v. Grant,
486 U.S. 414, 419 (1988).

133. See

LAURENCE

H.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW,

1022 (2d ed.

1988); see also supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of overbreadth.
134. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 858 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
("You are a harasser when ... [y]ou display a confederate flag on the door of your

room in the residence hall."). According to the interpretive guide you are also a
harasser when you exclude someone from a floor party because you think they are a
lesbian. Id.
135. Id. at 861.
136. E.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
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idea and forces it upon another student through harassing conduct,
it is no longer simply an expression, but expression coupled with
action. It is possible that existing laws and university policies can be
utilized to prohibit "conduct" rather than speech. The court in Doe
did not see this distinction because of the apparent belief that both
are speech and even if offensive, can not be regulated.
Society should not protect people from those who seek to advo-7
3
cate beliefs which are merely offensive to a majority of its citizens.
Advocation of one's beliefs is a fundamental principle behind the
First Amendment. By denying the right of expression to those who
hold ideas contrary to the current politically popular belief, we risk
that someday our own ideas might be suppressed and prohibited on
the basis of extremism.' 38 First Amendment rights should not be
viewed in the context of only permitting "what's hot" on the current
language chart.
Policies which narrowly regulate speech affecting individuals and
is more than just offensive, but is harmful, would only protect
individuals from being singled out for harassment. The expression of
an offensive idea which is not directed at a single individual can be
combated with counter-debate and speech that educates the public to
the truth. One of the truly great values of free speech is ascertainment
of truth through vigorous debate. 3 9
concurring) ("[Tihe remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.");
see Nat Hentoff, The Right Thing At ASU, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 25, 1991,
at A19. (When a group of minority students were harassed on the basis of their race,
instead of demanding that the university punish the offenders, they took the offensive.
Speeches were given, press conferences held, and public rallies were attended. All of
these counter-attacks proved successful in the eyes of the original group of students
harassed. Id.
137. See United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2410 (1990) ("Government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.") (citing Texas v. Johnson 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2544 (1988));
F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) ("The fact that society may
find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed if it is the
speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it
constitutional protection."); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) ("It is
firmly settled that ...

the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely

because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.").
138. E.g., Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 151 (1961) (Black., J., dissenting) ("I do not believe that it can be
too often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or
later they will be denied to those we cherish.").
139. E.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
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IMPACT

The implications of this case should not be lost on universities
across the country simply because of the limited mandatory precedential value. Doe, in conjunction with the recent UWM Post 4 °decision,
is the only judicial decision regarding university speech code policies.
Both cases have held such policies to be unconstitutional.1 41 In reaching its conclusion, the Doe court left windows of opportunity through
which colleges and universities may seek to regulate problems of racial
harassment. According to the court, the First Amendment "presents
no obstacle to the establishment of internal University sanctions as to
' 42
any of these categories of conduct."'
Within the court's opinion is a tacit assertion that conduct such
as "racial and ethnic ephithets, slurs and insults .. .made with the
specific intent to harass or intimidate the victim" might be sanctionable . 43 Such a regulation, if narrowly drawn, may withstand a First
Amendment challenge. The Supreme Court, in Sable Communications
v. F.C.C., held that "the government may ... regulate the content
of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling
interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest." '44 It is possible that a university policy that was
concurring) (The founders of the United States Constitution "[believed] in the power
of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by
law-the argument of freedom in its worst form."). See Mari J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim 's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320,
2350 (1989). The author, in setting forth the "[a]merican position" states,
[w]e have no way of knowing what the right results are in advance. Ideas
that were once accepted as truth we now reject. Because our ideas about
what we want as a society are changing and emergent, we cannot say that

certain ideas are unacceptable. New ideas often meet opposition and we

have seen new ideas including major advances in civil rights eventually
become the majority position.
Matsuda at 2350.
140. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents No. 90-C-328 (E.D. Wis., Oct. 11,
1991) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist., file).
141. The impact of Doe and UWM Post on colleges and universities in the
United States may depend on the Supreme Court's decision in a pending case
regarding the constitutionality of a city ordinance prohibiting ethnic intimidation.
See In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991), cert granted, R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 111 S.Ct. 2795 (Minnesota Supreme Court decision holding that a

St. Paul city ordinance which outlawed numerous types of racially-bias related
conduct may only be construed to apply to expressive conduct which falls into the
category of "fighting words.").
142. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 862 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
143. Id.
144. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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directed only at blatant racial insults might be constitutional. In fact,
it seems society is prepared to recognize that the most severe racial
harassment is indeed deserving of punishment, as evidenced by the
vast array of state and federal laws protecting individuals from
conduct such as "ethnic intimidation" or racial harassment in the
workplace. 45
A narrow interpretation of the Doe case might lead to the
conclusion that no racial harassment policy adopted by a university
would be constitutional. A careful scrutiny of the decision, however,
would recognize that the Policy adopted by the University of Michigan, as applied, proved to be a bad test case. The University's
application of the Policy in Doe left little opportunity for the court
to offer approval of the Policy, given the manner in which it was
applied and the examples provided in the interpretive guidebook.
The District Court, in understanding the worthy goal the University sought to achieve, recognized that certain types of racial harassment can be prohibited. 46 Universities should be using these existing
avenues of allowable regulations to draft policies that are more
narrowly tailored and consistently applied. Additionally, universities
that wish to regulate such behavior could utilize existing state and
federal laws relating to this type of behavior.' 47 While the best hope
for a harassment-free campus lies in educating students, only through
proper, narrowly-tailored restrictions will hardcore harassers be deterred.
II.

CONCLUSION

The court in Doe was faced with a difficult dilemma. Given the
extensive legislation which exists regarding racial harassment, it is
certain that the goal sought to be achieved by the University of
Michigan under the terms of the Policy was valid. The eradication of
bigotry and racial hatred in this nation is a goal towards which all
individuals should strive. Such an achievement can not come, however,
at the expense of our first amendment freedoms.
In utilizing the Policy the University inadvertently applied the
terms of the Policy to situations that are protected areas of speech
under the First Amendment. Because of the practice of the University
to apply the Policy to protected speech, the court had little choice
145. See supra note 13 for discussion of state statutes attempting to regulate
ethnoviolence.
146. See supra note 86 for types of behavior that may be prohibited.
147. See supra note 85 for state and federal laws relating to prohibited behavior.
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but to strike the Policy down on the grounds of overbreadth and
vagueness. Windows of opportunity, however, were left open for
universities to effectively regulate problems of racial harassment.
Hopefully, these constitutionally acceptable methods of eradicating
racial harassment from college and university campuses will be utilized. Only then may we see universities reacting to these problems in
a manner acceptable to both the Constitution and the university
community.
TIMOTHY
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